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A B S T R A C T   
Despite improved fisheries management, overcapacity is still a major issue in fisheries worldwide. This study 
investigates the economic effect of a mismatch between catch capacity and quota holdings on the economic 
performance of fishing boats operating in a system of Individual Fishing Quota (IFQ) system. Based on the data of 
71 fishing vessels, which constitute the entire fleet of Norwegian seagoing purse seiners, an ordinal least squares 
model is applied by including the vessel’s catch capacity, quota holding, and return on invested capital (ROIC) 
along with several control variables. The estimated results suggest that the key factor affecting ROIC is over-
capacity. Specifically, when the relative ratio of capacity and quota holding increases by 1%, a vessel’s ROIC 
decreases by 0.692%. This finding indicates that the overcapacity problem in the Norwegian seagoing purse seine 
fleet still exists even more than a decade after an IFQ regime was introduced. The paper concludes by discussing 
implications of the findings.   
1. Introduction 
Following “the tragedy of the commons” [1], in open-access fish-
eries, boat owners often overinvest in capacity, which causes fish stocks 
at risk to be depleted. As a consequence, authorities have taken an 
overall responsibility to regulate fishing to avoid losing significant so-
cioeconomic values. The regulation often taken by many countries in the 
world is combining a total allowable catch (TAC) system with an indi-
vidual fishing quota (IFQ) system. The TAC secures biological sustain-
ability, and the IFQ avoids the race for fish and reduce overcapacity and 
therefore ensures economic sustainability for players (e.g., Refs. [2–5]). 
For fishing vessel owners, wild fish represents a critical part of their 
business. In limited-entry and quota-managed fisheries, fishing rights 
give a firm access to valuable natural resources (e.g., Ref. [6]). There-
fore, fishing rights are intangible threshold resources that qualify a firm 
to participate in the industry. Accordingly, investments in fishing rights 
are considered to be of strategic importance. Moreover, to exploit the 
fishing rights on hand, a firm must invest in physical assets, such as catch 
capacity, fishing vessels, and fishing gears. Finally, human capital from 
the perspective of a skipper and a crew is needed to efficiently operate a 
vessel. Therefore, in an investment decision, adjusting investments in 
the interrelated asset classes to maximize the profit of a firm is critical 
[47]. 
Nøstbakken et al. [7] provided a survey of the literature on invest-
ment behavior and capacity adjustment in fisheries. She highlighted the 
sparsity of empirical contributions, although several theoretical studies 
have been conducted on the investment behavior of fishing vessel firms. 
Moreover, most of the available empirical studies discuss how decom-
missioning arrangements, buyback programs, subsidies, and tax in-
terventions affect business investments (e.g., Refs. [8–10]). Some 
empirical studies are also concerned with entry and exit issues in 
open-access fisheries (e.g., Ref. [11]). Nøstbakken et al. [7] underlined 
the need for more empirical studies on investment strategies at the firm 
level based on adequate financial data. Moreover, Iversen et al. [12] 
claimed that there is a knowledge gap on how businesses strategically 
adapt and financially perform under different institutional frameworks. 
The main objective of the present study is to empirically investigate 
the relationship between firms’ investments in vessels and quotas and 
their subsequent financial performance under an IFQ regime. Table 1 
provides an overview of the most significant modifications of Norway’s 
IFQ regime in relation to a “pure” IFQ system. Specifically, this study 
investigates whether Norwegian seagoing purse seiners have been able 
to adjust their catch capacities to their available quota holdings by using 
firm level data. This is a vital strategic decision for firms as a mismatch is 
expected to inflict economic losses on the company. Consequently, the 
research issue raised in this study is, how costly is a mismatch between a 
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fishing vessel’s catch capacity and its quota holding? 
The validity of the comparison of firms’ performance is highest when 
firms are similar [14]. When analyzing the financial consequences of 
quota and vessel investments, isolating the financial performance of the 
catch business unit of a firm from other business units is methodologi-
cally significant. Accordingly, the Norwegian seagoing purse seine fleet 
is selected as an empirical case because this industry is made up of quite 
similar firms in terms of species caught, catch technology applied, and 
catch capacity of the vessels. None of the firms are vertically or hori-
zontally integrated with other business units, such as processing, sales, 
or non-fisheries. Moreover, each seagoing purse seiner in Norway is 
formally organized as a limited liability company. Thus, the information 
in the firms’ public financial statements only includes data related to the 
catch business unit. In addition, the purse seine fleet is part of a 
subsidy-free, limited-entry industry that is subject to a TAC and a IFQ 
management regime, which has been in work for more than a decade. 
In the following section, investment theory related to fisheries, and 
the economic importance of adjusting catch capacity to the quota 
holding is presented. Next, the context of the study, the Norwegian 
seagoing purse seine fleet, is described. After that, the research method 
is outlined, followed by the presentation of the estimated results. 
Finally, the findings are discussed. 
2. Theory 
Economic theory assumes that the motivation for any firm to invest is 
to maximize its wealth (e.g. Ref. [15]). Conventional investment theory 
states that a firm should invest as long as the net present value of the 
future cash flow of the investment is positive. The opportunity cost of 
capital is critical when analyzing the profitability of investments. An 
economic rational investor will only invest more as long as the expected 
return overrides the cost of capital [16]. Within IFQ management sys-
tems, ship owners can buy and sell not only vessels but also quotas (e.g., 
Ref. [17]). These are strategic decisions that can significantly affect the 
scale, scope, and profitability of the business activities [18]. 
When investing in quotas and vessels, the time perspective is nor-
mally long [19]. As a result, future expectations can be of great impor-
tance to the investment decisions taken. Annual fluctuations in the 
biological resource base and uncertainty related to product prices, ex-
change rates, and oil prices can lead to considerable uncertainty about 
the future cash flow. If the investment is wholly or partly irreversible, for 
example, in the form of a specialized vessel with a limited secondhand 
value, the risk of the investment increases. An uncertainty about the size 
of the investment expense and required rate of return (RRR) is also 
existent [20]. The greater the uncertainty, the less willingness to invest 
[21]. Empirical studies estimate a fishing vessel firm’s RRR to be very 
high relative to the expected return on alternative investments [22]. 
However, RRR can be reduced by introducing property rights systems, 
such as IFQ in fisheries (ibid.). When a fishing is closed, intangible as-
sets, such as quotas, are valued in the market. Thus, ineffective and 
unprofitable vessels are given an incentive to withdraw from the in-
dustry by disinvesting. This may especially be the case if alternative 
income opportunities exist outside the industry [9]. After an exit, the 
released quotas will be available on the market for the remaining 
players. 
Nøstbakken [19] found that firm-specific variables have a greater 
impact on the investment behavior of the Norwegian purse seine fleet 
than economic factors. She argued that two owners with equal pro-
ductivity and profitability can choose widely different investment stra-
tegies. For example, one firm may choose to invest in quotas, whereas 
another may choose to sell. A reason for this is that the investors can 
have different expectations of the future profitability. However, it may 
also be due to different attitudes toward risk among the players. Another 
explanation is that the Norwegian purse seine fleet was composed of 
some “old school” fishing vessel owners with lower growth ambitions 
than their more modern peers, which were governed by a professional 
organization. The findings indicate, according to Nøstbakken [19] that 
the economic explanation that the resources (in this case, tradable 
quotas) are acquired by the most productive and profitable actors in the 
industry is not necessarily valid. Instead, firm-specific factors (e.g., 
prestige, generation change, and mimetic behavior) are decisive for 
firms, which invest in quotas and vessels. 
In her review on investment behavior and capacity adjustment in 
fisheries, Nøstbakken et al. [7] point out four distinct types of capital 
that can be encountered in economic studies of marine fisheries: natural, 
physical, human, and intangible. Natural capital is commercial fish 
stocks produced by marine ecosystems and harvested by commercial 
fishing firms. Intangible capital describes the need for a fishing firm to 
own fishing rights and quotas in regulated fisheries. Physical capital 
includes infrastructure in the form of a vessel and gear that is required 
for the operation of the vessel. Finally, human capital comprises skilled 
management and the crew required to catch and process fish. As an 
individual firm usually have no noticeable impact on fish stock size, 
natural capital is usually taken as given. Accordingly, this study explores 
firms’ investments in physical capital, human capital, and intangible 
fishing rights only. 
2.1. Intangible capital 
Intangible capital investments includes transferable licenses and 
quotas. The main motive for introducing fishing rights, in addition to the 
need to protect fish stocks, is to reduce the race for fish. When investing 
in quotas, costs, and revenues are affected. Specifically, if rights are 
bought in the market, then they will be introduced in the accounts of the 
firms as an intangible asset in the balance sheet and as depreciation in 
the income statement. Other relevant variables being equal, a larger 
quota results in a larger catch, which gives rise to higher revenues. 
Larger catches may also enable a firm to better exploit economics of 
scale [23] and reduce transaction costs [24]. 
Table 1 
The IFQ regime implemented in Norway’s purse seine fleeta.  
No Modification Motivation 
M0 Only active Norwegian fishermen 
are entitled to own fishing rights 
and quotas. 
To secure national ownership of 
valuable natural resources 
M1 Quota can only be bought together 
with a vessel in the same group. The 
bought vessel has to be scrapped. 
To remove excess catch capacity from 
the vessel group 
M2 Whenever the quota is traded, at 
least 5% will be returned to the 
vessel group, so the buyer retains a 
maximum of 95%. 
To let firms that do not directly 
participate in the quota transactions 
reap benefits as there are fewer vessels 
to share the TAC. This rule also helps 
to reduce quota prices 
M3 If the quota is traded across a 
county border, then it will be 
reduced. The largest reduction will 
take place if the quota is traded 
from a county in the north to a 
county in the south (45%). 
To reduce the tendency to the regional 
concentration of quotas 
M4 Each vessel has a quota ceiling on 
850 tons at present, which 
represents approximately 2% of the 
vessel group’s TAC share. 
To prevent overconcentration of 
quotas on a few vessels 
M5 Each firm has a quota ceiling, which 
corresponds to approximately 6% 
of the vessel group’s TAC share. 
To avoid overconcentration of quotas 
on a few firms 
M6 Tradable quotas (structural quotas) 
are time-limited. When they expire, 
they will be returned and allocated 
to the remaining vessels in the 
group. 
To keep the community’s ability to 
govern fisheries and express that the 
fish resources are a common property 
M7 Trade is only permitted to take 
place within the same vessel group. 
To prevent large vessels from 
outcompeting small vessels 
M8 Quota leasing is not permitted.   
a Adapted from Johnsen and Jentoft [13]; and Standal and Asche [5]. 
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Nevertheless, the effect of investing in quota on a firm’s profit is an 
empirical issue depending on the net effect of increasing revenue and 
costs given by the quota purchase. In strategic factor markets, firms can 
buy and sell resources [25]. If the markets are perfectly competitive, 
then firms will only obtain normal returns from purchasing strategic 
resources, such as quotas, in an efficient market place [19]. 
2.2. Physical capital 
To exploit available fishing rights, a firm must also invest in physical 
capital, such as vessels and gears. A firm can invest in new vessel 
technology to become more efficient and profitable. Townsend [26] 
found that access restrictions on fishing can lead companies to invest 
more in physical capital. Shipping firms can invest in high-quality 
technology to improve the working days and safety of the crew and 
attract more skilled fishermen. This situation can, however, lead to 
overinvestment in capital. The effect may be reinforced if the investment 
is subsidized by public tax incentives (ibid.). Nevertheless, the tech-
nology available and purchased in an open market can hardly give a firm 
any competitive advantage as it can easily be imitated by its rivals [25]. 
The most efficient purse seiners are those who use the shortest time 
to fill their quotas, considering that this does not impair product quality 
and market price. To achieve this aim, a vessel is expected to have a 
large catch capacity, modern capture technology, and a powerful en-
gine. Such a vessel can also have lower transaction costs [27] than a 
vessel based on old and less efficient fishing technology. For a boat 
owner harvesting a natural resource only seasonally available, the 
possibility of cost-effective fishing will only exist for brief periods [28]. 
In this case, firms should have sufficient catch capacity to exploit the 
short time windows for fishing when they are open. 
2.3. Human capital 
The resource-based view (RBV) of strategy examines potential 
sources of economic rents internally in the firm (e.g., Refs. [29,30]). 
Thus, efficiency is primarily driven by resources and capabilities, which 
are built within the boundaries of the firm. Resources that are owned or 
controlled by the firm, such as fishing rights, vessels, and gears, are 
assets [30]. Capabilities, on the other hand, are described as socially 
complex procedures that determine how efficient a firm is able to 
transform inputs into outputs. Properties of the accumulation process 
can make resources and capabilities valuable, rare, inimitable, and 
non-substitutable and thus hard to acquire for competitors [29]. This is 
in contrast to resources that are bought in strategic factor markets [25]. 
Hence, RBV claims that the basis for competitive advantages and supe-
rior performance is grounded in resources and capabilities that are 
heterogeneously distributed between firms and are immobile and hard 
to imitate. Accordingly, the way a vessel is applied to harvest the 
available quota can give rise to a competitive advantage and 
above-normal profit. The same argument goes for the culture of the 
crew, their fishing practices, and the relationships between fishermen 
and the skipper [31]. 
Within an IFQ management system, adapting the physical catch ca-
pacity to the quota holding is a central strategic decision for the man-
agement of the individual fishing vessel firm [12,32]. The size of the 
quota and catch capacity of the vessel must be aligned for a firm to 
operate efficiently. Consequently, quota investors are expected to follow 
up with more vessel investments so that the intangible and physical 
capital investments support each other in a balanced way. In theoretical 
works, capital invested in vessel, and quotas is often considered 
perfectly malleable [33]. However, the more common situation in 
fisheries is that investments in quotas and vessels have a degree of 
non-malleability. Accordingly, investment decisions become more 
complex as they are separable but related [7]. 
3. Empirical context 
Norwegian seagoing pelagic seiners constitute the empirical context 
of this study. The most valuable pelagic species fished is herring, 
mackerel, and capelin. After the national TAC is set, it is distributed to 
different pelagic vessel groups as group quotas. In addition to seagoing 
purse seiners, groups of pelagic trawlers, coastal pelagic boats, and purse 
seiners without concession also exist. The group quotas are further 
distributed to the vessels within the groups based on their quota hold-
ings. Approximately 2/3 of the TAC goes to the group quota of seagoing 
purse seiners. This group consists of purse seiners over 90 feet or has a 
load capacity over 1500 hl. The entire population of the seagoing purse 
seiner group in 2017 including 71 fishing vessels is covered in this study. 
3.1. Norway’s IFQ system 
Norway does not manage her fisheries by an individual transferable 
quota system (ITQ) officially, but in reality, the applied IFQ system has 
many similarities with an ITQ system (e.g., Refs. [2–5,13]). A purse 
seine owner with Norwegian citizenship (M0 in Table 1) can buy 
another vessel, but only in the same vessel group, transfer the quota 
from the bought vessel, decommission the bought vessel, and keep the 
transferred quota for 20 years (M1 in Table 1). Quotas sold are curtailed 
by a certain proportion (M2 and M3 in Table 1). The truncated portion is 
redistributed to the vessel group. A vessel owner can buy and transfer 
quotas only up to a certain limit (M4 and M5 in Table 1). If an owner has 
more quotas than he can fish with his active vessel, then he can apply for 
a permit to split and sell it. Once the 20-year period is over, the quota 
goes back to the group (M6 in Table 1) and redistributed on a permanent 
basis to the remaining vessels in the seagoing purse seiner group. Thus, 
all vessels in the group will get more quotas. 
Table 1 shows that in the seagoing purse seine group, one national 
market with regional boundaries and restrictions is involved [4]. There 
is a certain curtailment of the quota depending upon, which county the 
quota is transferred to. This measure is intended to limit regional con-
centration of fishing capacity and operations. 
3.2. Quota holdings 
A pelagic quota consists of a quota package that gives a vessel the 
right to catch a certain volume of herring, mackerel, and capelin. After 
the collapse of the herring fishery about 50 years ago, the vessels were 
allocated with vessel quotas. As of 2005, quotas have been tradable, 
provided that the vessel selling the quota exits the fishery. Quotas that 
have been traded are referred to as structural quotas (SQ), whereas the 
original quota of the vessel, which were received free of charge from the 
state, is described as base quotas (BQs). 
As presented in Fig. 1, the majority of boat owners in Norway’s purse 
seine fleet have purchased quota shares. Standal and Asche [5] found 
that approximately 19% of the total group quota had been sold within 
the seagoing purse seiner vessel group between 2006 and 2015. 
3.3. Catch capacity and quota holdings 
The total quota holding of a seagoing purse seiner includes the BQs, 
SQs, and other quotas (OQs). Some purse seiners have other fish quotas 
than herring, mackerel, and capelin. These species are, however, less 
valuable, including sand eels, Norway pout, brisling, and blue whiting. 
Accordingly, the economic effect of OQs is less significant. 
Fig. 2 shows the relationship between the vessels’ quota holding (BQ 
þ SQ) and their catch capacity. Physical catch capacity is measured in 
vessel capacity units (VCU), formulated as vessel length (meters) x 
vessel width (meters) þ .45 � engine power (for more details, see Data 
and Methods section). As illustrated in Fig. 2, a great variety is found 
among the vessels with regard to how well the catch capacity is adjusted 
to the vessels’ quota holding. 
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3.4. Descriptive data 
Table 2 presents the descriptive data of the Norwegian seagoing 
pelagic fishing fleet, which includes 71 vessels. The mean return on 
invested capital (ROIC) of these vessels was 11% in 2017, varying from a 
minimum of 1% to a maximum of 81%. The mean BQ held by a vessel is 
431 tons, and more than half of the vessels have a BQ of more than 448 
tons. Variations in BQ owned by the vessels is very small as the 
maximum BQ owned by a vessel is 500 tons, which is only 52 tons more 
than the mean value. Twenty-one vessels have never bought quotas 
(SQs) in the market. The remaining 50 vessels have bought SQs with a 
mean amount of 113 tons. Forty-eight vessels have OQs, which include 
species of sand eels, Norway pout, brisling, and blue whiting. The 
average VCU is 2,588, the minimum VCU is 924, and the maximum VCU 
Fig. 1. Distribution of Base quotas (BQ) and Structural quotas (SQ) of seagoing purse seiners as of 2017. The two horizontal dotted lines show the quota ceiling 
before 2015 (650) and after (850). 
Source: Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries database of licensed purse seiners (https://register.fiskeridir.no/fartoyreg/) 
Fig. 2. Vessel catch capacity (VCU, left axis) and quota holding (right axis) as of 2017 (r2 ¼ 0.64). OQ is not included in the figure as it uses another unit of 
measurement than BQ and SQ. 
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is 4616. The average ratio of catch capacity against quota holdings 
(CAQ; catch capacity/(BQ þ SQ)) is 4.76. The variation of the ratio 
between the vessels is huge. The CAQ varies from 2.65 to 7.89, indi-
cating the existence of a mismatch between catch capacity and quota 
holdings for many vessels. 
The mean age of the vessels is 16 years old, with a relatively even 
distribution between the young and the old as the medium number (14) 
is close to the mean value. The information of the attributes of the 
vessels not presented in the table is as follows: 8 vessels belong to firms 
owing more than one vessel; 21 vessels belong to larger holding com-
panies; and 49 vessels are located in two regions, namely, Hordaland, 
and Møre and Romsdal. Those vessels are expected to have high ROIC if 
they belong to a company owning more than one vessel or a large 
holding company as they gain advantage in sharing information. For the 
same reason, it is also expected that the vessels located in the cluster 
region of Hordaland, Møre and Romsdal have higher ROIC. 
4. Data and Methods 
4.1. Data 
The accounting data of each of the 72 fishing firms were obtained 
from the Brønnøysund Register Center (in Norwegian: 
Brønnøysundregistrene, www.brreg.no) based on industry code and 
company identification and analyzed. All firms had a positive ROIC 
except for one (ROIC of   8.56%). This vessel is regarded as an outlier in 
the econometric analysis and was therefore deleted from the data for 
further model estimation. The sample size for the final estimation 
therefore becomes 71. Data on the vessel quota holdings and catch ca-
pacity were retrieved from the public database of licensed purse seiners 
published by the Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries (https://register.fi 
skeridir.no/fartoyreg/). 
4.2. Measuring catch capacity 
The concepts of capacity and capacity utilizations of fishing vessels 
are complicated as the most important input factor, fish, is beyond the 
fishermen’s control and can widely vary between years and during the 
year [34]. Moreover, in most cases, fish is caught free of charge; thus, 
the input has no cost. Consequently, measuring capacity and capacity 
utilization in fisheries is not straightforward [20,35]. 
Gross register tonnage, gross tonnage, or tonnage units are used as a 
physical measures of the vessel’s volume. Furthermore, the age of the 
vessel may give an indication of the effectiveness of the technological 
equipment. However, the relationship between the efficiency of the 
vessel and its age may be weak or nonexistent [12]. Another physical 
capacity measure used is engine power measured in kW or horsepower. 
All the above measures help describe different physical dimensions of 
the capacity of a vessel. 
One physical capacity measure that combines some of the afore-
mentioned measures is VCU. This measure originates from English 
fisheries management and is recommended by FAO [36]. The measure is 
composed of the length and width of the vessel and its engine power. The 
formula is as follows: 
VCU¼L�W þ 0:45� engine power;
where L is the vessel length, W is the width (both in meters), and engine 
power is measured in kW (1 kW � 1.36 hp). For example, following the 
formula, a vessel that is 73.3 m long and 12.6 m wide and has an engine 
of 4027 kW has a VCU value of 2736. However, some disadvantages 
exist with the VCU measurement unit. VCU is a purely physical measure, 
devoid of economic rationale. Moreover, as the type of fishing gear is not 
included, a comparison between different fisheries is difficult. 
4.3. Measuring financial performance 
The aim of the present study is to estimate how costly a mismatch is 
between a fishing vessel’s catch capacity and its quota holding. The 
operationalized dependent variable in the study is the firms’ ROIC 
resulting from the catch business only. The performance measure used is 
relative and thus enables comparing firms of different sizes [37,38]. 
There are surprisingly few analyses of accounting data in fisheries, while 
this has become an active field in aquaculture, e.g. Asche et al. [39]; and 
Misund and Nygård [40]. 
However, in traditional financial statements, assets are grouped in 
relation to their liquidity and debt relative to maturity. Such a format is 
useful for creditors when analyzing whether a firm is sufficiently liquid 
to pay its debt on maturity. For the purpose of this study, which is 
profitability measurement, a standard setup of the income statement and 
balance sheet was not suitable for further analysis. Therefore, the 
analysis is based on reorganized income statements and balance sheets 
given by Penman [38]. The overall purpose is to separate assets and 
liabilities into one of two categories: 1) operating assets and liabilities 
and 2) financial assets and liabilities. The same procedure was also 
applied to the profit and loss accounts. An essential purpose in the study 
is to calculate the operating results of the core activity, i.e., the catch 
business only, which is not affected by financial items. Subsequently, the 
operating profit was calculated after tax in accordance with the net 
operating profit less adjusted taxes (NOPLAT) as outlined in Table 3. 
When separating operating income and expenses and financial in-
come and expenses in the profit and loss account, a corresponding 
separation was made in the balance sheet when calculating the working 
capital. Therefore, the operational working capital was allowed to 
consist of the assets that were regarded necessary for the operation, i.e., 
receivables (debtors), prepaid expenses, and inventory. Then, financial 
assets were made up of cash, other liquid funds, and short-term in-
vestments. As some cash regarded as financial operating assets is nor-
mally needed for transaction purposes, an amount equivalent to 3% of 
the revenues was taken as required cash for ongoing transactions. The 
remainder was considered financial assets. 
Current liabilities were made up of trade payables, current liabilities 
due to accrued liabilities and due taxes and fees, and any other short- 
term liabilities for, which interest is not payable. Deferred dividend, 
which was not paid but booked as accrued liabilities, was reallocated to 
equity. In short, debt that did not charge financial expenses with interest 
or similar payments was regarded as operating debt and included in the 
operating working capital. The remainder was regarded as short-term 
operational interest-bearing debt together with long-term interest- 
bearing liabilities. In sum, these items were considered financial liabil-
ities. Operating assets (property, plant, and equipment), and net work-
ing cash and receivables, less operating liabilities, is considered net 
invested capital (IC). Based on NOPLAT, the firm’s ROIC is calculated as 
Table 2 
Descriptive data of seagoing pelagic fishing vessels.   
ROIC BQ SQ VCU CAQ Age 
Minimum 1% 256 0 924 2,65 2 
Mean 11% 431 118 2588 4,76 16 
Medium 5% 448 113 2608 4,73 14 
Maximum 81% 500 420 4616 7,89 51 
Standard error 2% 7 12 94 0,14 1  
Table 3 
Calculating NOPLAT from fishing activities.   
Sales revenues 
- Operating costs 
- Labor costs 
- Depreciation and amortization 
¼ EBIT (earnings before interests and taxes) 
- General taxes on EBIT 
¼ NOPLAT  
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An ordinal least squares (OLS) model is applied to investigate the 
existence of overcapacity at the firm level in the Norwegian seagoing 
purse seine fleet. The model estimates whether the relationship between 
the quota holding owned by a vessel and the vessel’s catch capacity 
affect the ROIC. Aside from the key variables of quota holdings (BQ, SQ 
and OQ) and catch capacity (CAQ), other variables, such as vessel age 
(Age), if the vessel is part of a multi-vessel firm (MVF), strategic alliance 
(SA), or co-located (COL), are also included in the model as control 
variables. The empirical model is specified as 
lnROICi ¼ ∝0 þ ∝1lnBQi þ ∝2lnSQi þ ∝3lnOQi þ ∝4lnCAQi þ ∝5Agei
þ ∝6MVFi þ ∝7SAi þ ∝8COLi þ ∝9D1i þ ∝10D2i þ ei; i
¼ 1; 2;…N;
(1) 
Basic quota (BQ) and structure quota (SQ) are separately measured 
to avoid the measurement of errors as the properties of BQ and SQ are 
different (i.e., BQ is received for free, whereas SQ is bought in the 
market). When SQ is equal to zero, it means the vessel has not bought 
any quota in the market. In these cases, a minimum quota unit (SQ ¼ 1) 
is provided to take the logarithm. OQ is specified as a dummy variable (1 
for vessels having OQ; otherwise, 0). A volume variable for OQ was not 
used because this quota is measured by different units other than BQ and 
SQ. Moreover, the economic significance of this quota is modest. 
As we have discussed, CAQ presents the ratio of vessel catch capacity 
(VCU) to the volume of quota holdings (BQ þ SQ). CAQ is used instead of 
catch capacity for two reasons. First, the definition of capacity does not 
mean the higher capacity, the larger the overcapacity. Overcapacity is 
defined as a vessel having excessive capacity for catch in relation to 
quota (e.g., Refs. [20,32]). Second, quota volume is highly correlated 
with vessel capacity. This argument is intuitive as a large vessel will 
normally have a larger quota than a smaller one. The correlation be-
tween quota volume and vessel capacity is 0.64. When two highly 
correlated variables are included in the same model, the model will have 
the problem of multicollinearity. 
For the left of the variables, MVF, SA, and COL are all dummy vari-
ables. They are 1 when a vessel has this characteristic, otherwise 0. The 
MVF (e.g., Ref. [41]), SA (e.g., Ref. [42]), and COL (e.g. Ref. [43]) 
variables are expected to have a positive effect on the vessel’s ROIC. 
The mean and medium values for ROIC (see Table 2) reveal a 
considerable asymmetric distribution with a long tail of high ROIC. The 
estimation model therefore introduces three dummy variables that will 
control for the effect of ROIC above 20%, between 10% and 20%, and 
below 10%. The argument is that the asymmetric ROIC can be due to a 
“skipper effect” or the operation and management of the vessel and/or 
the firm [31]. Thus, the human capital part of the independent variables 
can be years of experience or innate skills. The effect of human capital is 
often ignored in the literature [7]. Accordingly, the operating model 
captures the effect of heterogenic human capital among the firms by the 
dummy variables attributed to different ROIC ranges. In Equation (1), 
dummy 1 (D1), and dummy 2 (D2) are dummy variables for categories 1 
and 2, respectively. To avoid the singularity problem in the estimation, 
one of the category dummies is excluded from the model. This is the base 
variable when interpreting the estimated results of D1 and D2. 
Consistent with the investment behavior theory discussed by 
Nøstbakken et al. [7]; the independent variables in the model include 
three types of capital in fisheries investment. BQ, SQ, and OQ reflect 
intangible capital, CAQ, and Age are the physical capital of a vessel, and 
MVF, SA, COL, and dummies are related to human capital. 
5. Findings 
The estimated results of the model (Eq. (1)) are presented in Table 4. 
The model well explains the performance of ROIC as R-squared is 0.79. 
As expected, human capital is important to explain the variation of ROIC 
between vessels. This finding is in line with the RBV of strategy that 
examines potential economic rents internally in the firm (e.g., Refs. [29, 
30]). This statement is given based on the two category dummies, which 
are statistically significant at any reasonable level with large 
magnitudes. 
For the key variables of BQ, SQ, and OQ, none of the estimated co-
efficients of these variables are statistically significant at any reasonable 
level as suggested by their low t values. This finding means that neither 
the scale of the quota nor the type of quota (BQ, SQ or OQ) is important 
for the vessel’s ROIC. The key factor that significantly influences the 
vessel’s ROIC is overcapacity. This statement is based on the result that 
the estimated coefficient of CAQ is statistically significant, with a 
negative sign. The results suggest that when the relative ratio of capacity 
and quota volume of a vessel increases by 1%, the ROIC of the vessel 
decreases by 0.692%. This result further indicates that a big over-
capacity problem still exists in the Norwegian seagoing pelagic fishing 
fleet. 
For the control variables, the estimated coefficients of Age and SA are 
positive but not statistically significant at any normal significance level. 
This also holds for the estimated coefficient of MVF. The results suggest 
none of the factors such as age of vessel, whether a vessel is operated by 
a firm that belongs to a big fish holding company or operated by a firm 
owning multiple vessels affects a vessel’s ROIC. Our result of SA is 
different from that given by Ref. [42]. They found the average ROIC is 
higher when a vessel is operated by a firm that belongs to a big fish 
holding company. 
In the sample, approximately half of the vessels are located in the two 
regions Hordaland and Møre og Romsdal. When looking at the 
descriptive statistics, the average ROIC for the vessels in the two regions 
are lower than that of the vessels from other regions. Therefore, uni-
variate studies simply draw the conclusion that COL has a negative effect 
on ROIC. However, this claim is incorrect. In the model of this study, the 
effect of ROIC given by COL is isolated from the other factors, including 
quota, fishing capacity, management, and others. The estimated coef-
ficient of COL is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that 
being co-located has improved the vessel’s ROIC. Thus, the average 
ROIC for the vessels in the clusters is due to other factors, including the 
problem of overcapacity and poor management. 
6. Discussion 
Many studies on overcapacity are of a theoretical nature, and in-
dustry is used as the unit of analysis. Accordingly, more empirical 
studies on the economic consequences of overcapacity for firms based on 
adequate financial data have been called for in the literature (e.g. Refs. 
Table 4 
Estimated results of the model.   
Estimated coefficient t value 
Intercept 0.621 0.20 
BQ   0.163   0.32 
SQ 0.012 0.39 
OQ 0.066 0.42 
CAQ   0.692   2.29** 
Age 0.010 1.44 
MVF   0.124   0.60 
SA 0.238 1.56 
COL 0.299 1.97** 
D1   2.306   11.14** 
D2   1.039   4.24** 
R2 0.79 
** Significant at the 5% critical level. 
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[12,19]). In response to these requests, the research question raised in 
this study is, how costly is a mismatch between a fishing vessel’s catch 
capacity and its quota holding? To investigate the issue, data of 71 
Norwegian seagoing purse seiners were collected and analyzed using an 
OLS model including the vessel’s catch capacity, quota holding, and 
ROIC along with several control variables. 
The findings of this study show that the three variables representing 
the quotas (BQ, SQ, and OQ) all have t values indicating insignificance in 
explaining the variance of the dependent variable. These findings have 
important implications. First, the profitability of the players has not 
been improved by buying quotas (SQ) at a market price. Second, the 
findings indicate the lack of economies of scale in the seagoing purse 
seine fleet. As a consequence, the increase in the quota ceiling that took 
place in 2015 (see M4 in Table 1 and Fig. 1) cannot be expected to have a 
positive effect on the future profitability of the vessels. This finding is 
contrasted by Nøstbakken [44] but supported by Bjørndal and Gordon 
[45] who did not find evidence of large economies of scale in the Nor-
wegian seagoing purse seine fleet, concluding that most of the returns 
from scale effects have already been captured. 
The main variable in the study, CAQ, a measure of potential 
misalignment between an index of physical capacity and quotas (fishing 
rights and licenses) has a negative elasticity, and high statistical sig-
nificance. This finding supports the hypothesis that not an optimal 
alignment of physical capacity and quotas is presently available in the 
industry. The total quotas (the TAC of the vessel group) has a natural 
upper boundary within the fishery studied. This finding may then mean 
that the physical capacity is still too high, in spite of decommissioning of 
vessels in recent decades. 
Moreover, the distribution of quota within the group may not be 
optimal. If this is correct, then more quotas to the larger vessels relative 
to the smaller vessels will decrease the CAQ for high-capacity vessels 
(and increase for small-capacity vessels). The present market for quotas 
may over time lead to such a redistribution as older and smaller vessels 
are taken out of active use. 
The positive elasticity of age, though not quite statistically signifi-
cant, merits a comment. The sign of the elasticity may seem counter-
intuitive. However, we find an explanation in the definition and 
calculation of ROIC. The value of the denominator, IC, is a book value of 
the vessel, and intangible capital (licenses and quotas). Many high age 
vessels are almost fully depreciated. Some also fish only on BQs. BQs do 
have a market price, if sold. For many vessels of high age, a hidden value 
in their balance sheets is thus present as the market value is higher than 
the book value of the quotas. If the market value for assets had been 
available for this study, then the positive value for age would have most 
likely disappeared. 
The dummy for the COL effect is as expected. A steady concentration 
of purse seiners has been existent in Hordaland and Møre og Romsdal. 
This study shows that such concentration has resulted in a higher ROIC 
of the vessels when controlling for the other factors in the model. Being 
part of an SA or MVF did not have a significant effect on the firms’ 
financial performance. 
To conclude, our findings suggest that despite the closure of the 
commons, the introduction of quota systems, decommissioning pro-
grams, market-based structural measures, and detailed control over the 
fishermen’s day, problems created by overcapacity still exist in Nor-
way’s fisheries. Overcapacity leads to increased pressure on scarce fish 
resources and an economic loss to the society as productive resources 
that could have been used elsewhere get tied up in fisheries. Other 
negative consequences of overcapacity include high administrative 
management costs, conflicts in resource allocation, and limited financial 
return for the players that incur higher fixed costs than necessary [46]. 
The findings of this study indicate that the most important strategic 
decision for a firm is not to acquire the largest possible physical catch 
capacity or quota holding but to achieve the best possible match be-
tween two variables. If a mismatch has occurred, then a key question is, 
which of the two critical variables is most flexible and cost efficient to 
adjust? Catch capacity is a physical construct, which is not very flexible 
because it must be adjusted in large leaps. Increasing capacity can either 
be achieved by extending the vessel or replacing an old engine with a 
new and more powerful one. The quota holding, however, is an intan-
gible construct that can be adjusted in smaller increments. The use of the 
quota market is therefore most compelling for a firm to achieve a better 
fit between capacity and quota holding. This method will require the 
quota market to work without incurring high transaction costs for the 
players [24]. However, the modifications made to Norway’s variant of 
the IFQ regime (see Table 1) make the system rigid and costly to apply. 
As a consequence, aligning the catch capacity to the quota basis becomes 
more difficult for firms. 
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